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ABSTRACT 
 
 Face recognition is a form of biometric authentication that has received significant 
attention during the last decades. Using the human face as a key to security, face recognition 
technology can be potentially employed in many commercial and law enforcement 
applications. Despite of the fact that most of the face recognition techniques have greatly 
developed since the earliest forms, they suffer from spoofing attack which aims at deceiving 
the sensor by manipulating a face replica. One of the methods to solve this problem is to 
utilize facial movements.  
Facial muscle movements represent facial behavior which makes it unrealistic to be 
replicated and thus more distinctive. The third dimension of facial data – depth – is also 
utilized to improve recognition performance and to avoid video-based attack. Apart from 
security concerns, physiologists and psychologists have discovered the imperative role of 
facial movements during human face perception. Therefore, a “3D dynamic signature” can be 
added to augment facial recognition for which relying on static features related to shape and 
color.  
 In this thesis, a user authentication method based on spatiotemporal facial movements 
is proposed. Facial movements are obtained by making a facial expression in front of a 3D 
camera and are encoded by a standard system. By discretizing motion classifications into 
values, the problem of face recognition can be reinterpreted as matching two time sequences 
– probe and gallery – for each facial movement category obtained during the enrollment 
phase and the verification phase. Experiments have been conducted to show the possibility of 
discriminating subjects based on their facial movements.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Research Motivation 
Security system often has to make authentication decisions to grant access to 
legitimate users. Currently, the most common method is to use a string of characters and 
numbers, which are known as the password. However, passwords can be transferred and 
stolen which often lead to identity theft and fraud. A recent bug called heart bleed1 has been 
discovered in the widely used cryptographic software openSSL which opens up a breach 
allowing hackers to eavesdrop on communication, stealing any information protected from 
the services including passwords. Security organizations have advised the general public to 
alter their passwords and maintain dissimilar patterns for different accounts but little 
attention is received. The underlying reason is that passwords require memorization and are 
clumsy to manage, not to mention that they are increasingly insecure. The current trend of 
solving these problems is to use biometric authentication which utilizes body characteristics. 
Nevertheless, biometric methods suffer from impersonation attacks. For instance, audio clips 
of the user’s casual conversations can be recorded to deceive a voice recognition system; 
fingerprints may be collected from leftovers or latents to gain unauthorized access to a 
fingerprint-based system. Just like the other biometrics, face recognition can be bypassed by 
manipulating digitized facial images in front of a camera. Figure 1 illustrates such an attempt 
to spoof face recognition software by using a facial image displayed on a computer screen. 
Since most face recognition algorithms only detect and track physiological features, they  
                                                 
1 Details about the heart bleed bug can be found at http://heartbleed.com. 
2 
Figure 1. Face recognition software detects a face displayed on a computer screen. 
 
 
may not be able to distinguish between a real and a counterfeited face [1]. With the advent of 
social media and search engines, face images are publically exposed all over the internet and 
can be potentially used to impersonate identities without consent. In an effort to 
countermeasure such attacks, facial movements are exploited to detect liveness of the 
displaying face. However, traditional liveness detection techniques potentially suffer from 
video-based attacks. Thus, we have proposed to add the third dimension – depth – to 
effectively prevent impersonation attack from all aspects.                                       
Apart from security concerns, facial movements also benefit recognition. Numerous 
researches have been conducted by physiologists and psychologists on human face 
perception to understand the role of facial movements in machine recognition. Researchers 
have already discovered that familiar faces are easier to recognize when conveyed in moving 
sequence than in still photos [2]. It is argued that human’s ability to perform facial 
expressions is consisted of both nature and nurture, which encapsulates not only innate 
biological characteristics, but also learned facial behaviors stimulated by emotions [3]. In 
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agreement to this argument, neural studies have shown that during face perception, not only 
physiological features are extracted using face specific brain areas, but a consistent neural 
activity is also stored [4]. This implies that a “dynamic signature” can be employed for face 
identification. 
In this thesis, we propose a user authentication method based on facial movements. 
Given that each user makes a facial expression in a slightly different way, identities can be 
differentiated by exploiting facial behaviors or facial movement patterns. Facial behaviors 
are inherent to each user, thus are more distinctive and cannot be easily replicated. 
 
Thesis Organization 
 The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 delivers a formal definition 
of the problems being solved. Chapter 3 contains a literature review of existing 
authentication methods as well as related works in attack countermeasures and dynamic face 
recognition. Chapter 4 comprises the proposed methods for facial movement based 
authentication. Chapter 5 introduces reference designs for data acquisition and 
authentication. Chapter 6 details the experimental evaluations conducted with a discussion on 
the result. Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and presents potential future improvements. 
Additionally, Appendix A provides a complete list of the shaping units and action units that 
have been used in our approach. Appendix B includes the approval document from 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for researches involving human subjects. 
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CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
 The formal problem statement can be formulated as follows: given video images of a 
user’s face, verify his/her identity by extracting a spatiotemporal facial pattern and 
comparing it with existing templates in a database. Generally, we expect to be able to 
discriminate user identities with dynamical facial characteristics which are distinctive and 
invulnerable to impersonation attacks.  
 Facial movements are defined by the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) which 
categorizes facial behaviors by 46 action units (AUs), each of which is anatomically related 
to a specific set of facial muscles [5]. By characterizing facial movements into discrete 
values, the problem of face recognition is thus relaxed to matching two sequence – probe and 
gallery – for each AU acquired in a time interval under controlled environment. To restrict 
our scope, an existing 3D model is exploited to detect and track faces among video frames. 
Thus, in this thesis we focus on the modeling and matching of six major AU patterns 
specifically for an authentication scheme. 
Previous face recognition researches related to facial movements either focus on 
counter-measuring spoofing attacks [6] or coping with facial expression for robustness [7], 
however, anti-spoofing techniques suffer from video-based attack and, in both cases, face 
verification process are still carried out with respect to each user’s static physical appearance. 
Acknowledging both the security concerns and human perception benefits as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, our approach aims at differentiating user identities based on spatiotemporal facial 
patterns. Similarly, facial pattern recognition was proposed in [8] [9], nevertheless, a 
probabilistic path was taken to represent the identity space which may not reveal the true 
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facial pattern. By following the facial encoding standard FACS as defined by physiologists 
and psychologists, identity space can thus be represented by facial muscle changes revealed 
by making a facial expression.  
Traditional impersonation attacks can be efficiently prevented by exploiting facial 
movements, however, our approach can still be vulnerable to video-based attacks. Thus, the 
third dimension is also added acknowledging the fact that depth data can hardly be replayed 
in front of a 3D camera.  
 
Requirements 
 In general, our facial movement based user authentication method has to satisfy the 
following five requirements: 
(2.1) Make verification decision based on facial movements. 
(2.2) Invulnerable to impersonation attacks. 
(2.3) Non-learnable and non-replicable. 
(2.4) False positive is less than 10% for the samples gathered under controlled 
environment. 
(2.5) False negative is less than 10% for the samples gathered under controlled 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Face recognition is an important technique among biometric methods. Similar to 
many other biometric techniques, an individual’s identity is established based on 
physiological and/or behavioral characteristics rather than knowledge such as passwords or 
possession such as ID card. For the past few decades, numerous efforts have been made by 
the researchers to improve the performance of face recognition, however, less attention have 
been paid to another important factor, circumvention, which considers the vulnerability under 
spoofing attacks [10]. In the following sections, we briefly summarize existing authentication 
methods, evaluate state of the art liveness detection techniques preventing impersonation 
attacks, and also present related works on the dynamic face recognition approach.   
 
Authentication 
 Authentication is the binding of an identity to a subject. Based on the subject 
information used, authentication methods generally have four categories: knowledge-based 
(what the subject knows), object-based (what the subject has), biometric-based (what the 
subject is), and location-based (where the subject is) [11]. In the following sections, we 
examine knowledge-based and biometric-based approaches which are relevant to our 
research. 
 
Knowledge-based Approach 
Knowledge-based methods are the most widely used authentication techniques which 
generally include the traditional text-based passwords and the more recent graphical-based 
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approach. For decades, password has been used as the standard means for user 
authentications. Despite of its long existence and popularity, many studies have shown the 
vulnerabilities of password-based authentication [12] [13] . The major problem is that simple 
passwords can often be searched, such as using dictionary attack, whereas long, random, 
changing passwords are difficult to memorize. In an effort to ameliorate this problem, 
cryptography algorithms are developed to secure the passwords. For instance, the advanced 
encryption standards (AES), which has been adopted by the U.S. government as the standard, 
makes it mathematically infeasible to guess the password by encrypting it with a private key 
as long as 256 bits. However, the heart of any security system is people. Since the private key 
is too long to be remembered by the users, it has to be stored on a computer protected by 
another password – which lead us back to the original problem [14]. Another issue associated 
with passwords is that user often choose passwords consist of personal information, such as 
birth date, phone number, family name and so on. With the advancement of social media and 
global search, guessing attack (or linkage attacks) are another foreseeable thread against the 
usage of password. 
Motivated by the fact that humans are able to recall images better than text, graphic-
based user authentication has been proposed as an alternative to passwords [15]. Consider, 
for example, the Windows 8 operating system which has included picture password as a 
login option. A picture password is comprised of two complimentary parts: a picture chose 
by the user from user’s own collection and a set of drawing gestures applied on the picture. 
Coordinates of the gestures are recorded during enrollment and later compared with gestures 
performed when user attempt to login. Figure 2 illustrate an example of Windows 8 picture 
password where a straight line gesture is carried out from (𝑋1, 𝑌1) to (𝑋2, 𝑌2). By 
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Figure 2. Illustration of picture password on Windows 8. On the left are the common 
gestures and on the right are the recorded coordinates used for authentication. 
(Courtesy of MSDN Blog2) 
 
 
converting alphanumeric password into coordinates of pixels (including the gesture types), 
the number of possible combinations can be greatly increased. However, similar to text-based 
passwords, user often choose weak and predictable graphic passwords which potentially 
suffer from guessing attacks [16]. 
 
Biometric-based Approach 
 Identity theft is becoming a major concern in the modern society, especially in United 
States where credits are being heavily utilized. During the year of 2013, approximately 
280,000 incidents of identity thefts had been reported to Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN)3. 
Numerous methods have been proposed to prevent identity theft, one of them being 
biometrics, which has already been adopted by many law enforcement applications. For 
instance, criminal fingerprints are being collected and compared against suspects; facial 
photos are being taken at the border customs to verify travelers’ identities. Because biometric 
characteristics are inborn, they requires no memorization (as needed by passwords), no 
                                                 
2 More details about Windows 8 picture password can be found at  
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/b8/archive/2011/12/16/signing-in-with-a-picture-password.aspx 
 
3 More details about CSN identity theft report can be found at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/identity_theft/facts.html 
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physical possessions (as required by token-based methods), and most importantly, they are 
usually unique. Thus biometrics are invulnerable to traditional knowledge-based attacks such 
as guessing attacks and dictionary attacks.  
 Researchers of biometric-based authentication seem to exhibit a very diverse interest. 
Examples of biometric characteristics being studied include: DNA, ear, face, facial 
thermogram, hand thermogram, hand vein, fingerprint, hand geometry, iris, palmprint, retina, 
signature, and voice [10]. Taking a different route from traditional biometric methods based 
on physical features, behavioral biometrics are gaining increasing interests in this field. 
Behavioral biometrics such as key stroke dynamics [17] are advantageous because of its non-
obtrusiveness [18]. Additionally, assuming that feature traits are quantified accurately, 
behavioral biometrics are invulnerable to impersonation attack as experienced by traditional 
methods. Consider gait recognition, for example, which is the closest biometric method to 
our approach in terms of feature extraction and template matching, aims at extracting 
spatiotemporal gait pattern based on accelerometry [19]. In an attempt to attack a gait 
authentication system by imitating legitimate user’s walking pattern (commonly known as 
minimum-effort attack), Davrondzhon et al. have demonstrated that the attack does not 
significantly increase the chance of being accepted [20]. Since biometric methods usually 
have to contend with a variety of problems such as noisy data and false positives, a multi-
model biometric system has been introduced. By combining multiple sources of information, 
a multimodal system is able to improve matching performance and possibly prevent spoofing 
attacks [21]. 
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Face Liveness Detection 
The problem of spoofing attack can be prevented by detecting face liveness. It serves 
as an added layer to existing face recognition to perceive imposters with a fake face after the 
verification stage. Typically, there are two types of liveness detection indicators: texture and 
motion. For each category, related methods are presented below followed by a discussion on 
the advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Texture-based Approach 
Texture-based approach assumes that real faces have a higher frequency component. 
Based on the assumption that photos used for spoofing are typically printed on papers, fake 
faces can therefore be differentiated by detecting lower frequency component and texture 
loss due to print failures and overall image blur [6]. In the work of Gahyun Kim et al. texture 
features are extracted and analyzed using a popular texture descriptor called Local Binary 
Pattern (LBP) whereas frequency features are obtained by 2-D discrete Fourier transform. 
These two types of features are fused using Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier as the 
decision maker [22]. A similar approach was taken by Nalinakshi et al. where regions of eye, 
lip, chin and forehead are extracted using LBP and analyzed using mean and standard 
deviation; if there is any variation in either region, then face is considered alive else not alive 
[23]. Figure 3 illustrates variations that have been detected within eye, lip, forehead, and chin 
regions.  
Texture-based approaches are easy to implement and require no user collaboration. 
However, it is still possible to attack using a video displayed on a high-resolution screen as 
opposed to a printed paper. Therefore, Allan et al. proposed to measure the “visual rhythm”  
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Figure 3. Texture-based approach detecting variations in eyes, lip, forehead, and chin.  
(Courtesy of Nalinakshi et al. [23]) 
 
 
describing the Fourier spectrum noise that had been introduced due to image/video encoding 
[24]. Nevertheless, this approach relies heavily on the noise pattern and thus requires a 
diverse training database. 
 
Motion-based Approach 
Most other researches that have been conducted on this field interprets face liveness 
as motions, thus they focus on detecting differing facial components in videos or even real-
time. Bao et al. introduced a method based on the optical flow field which is a common 
method used for estimating motion direction in videos [25]. The basic idea is that optical 
flow field for 2D objects can be represented by a projection transformation from the 
reference field and thus whether the face is planar or not can be determined by measuring the 
difference between fields. Inspired by the optical flow approach, Andre et al. used image 
background region as the reference field, and directly compared motion direction with face 
region using optical flow correlation (OFC) [26]. OFC works by exploiting the fact that 
genuine faces move with respect to the background whereas faces in printed-photos move 
along with the background. Similarly, Kollreider et al. used the optical flow of lines (OFL) of 
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certain face parts to detect face liveness [27]. By assuming that a 3D face generates greater 
motion at central face parts such as nose compared to outer parts such as ears, face liveness 
can be detected by calculating the motion difference between the two parts. Figure 4 
illustrates the motion generated by different focused face parts. Their experimental results 
have shown that, due to natural and unintentional human behavior, small head rotations will 
always occur whenever a live face is presented in front of a camera, thus horizontal OFL 
between two parts can be computed to decide liveness. Taking a similar human natural 
behavior path, Gang et al. employed Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) to describe the 
blinking of eyes to determine a live face [28]. 
 
Figure 4. Horizontal OFL focused on two face parts - nose and ears.  
(Courtesy of Kollreider et al. [27]) 
 
 
The fundamental basis of all motion-based approaches is that static facial images 
move significantly different from real faces which are 3D objects, and the motion pattern 
generated by planar objects can be differentiated from motions resulted by real human faces. 
When using motion analysis, it is difficult to spoof by 2D face images. However, it may face 
issues under video-based attacks (such as OFC).  It may also suffer when there is low motion 
information due to different user behavior. For instance, eye closity may not be detected if 
user stares at the camera for a certain amount of time without blinking eyes, if such time 
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takes longer than the timeout threshold, false negative occurs. As mentioned by Saptarshi and 
Dhrubajyoti, motion-based approaches may also fail when sophisticated attacks are 
performed such as using 3D sculpture face model [6]. For example, the aforementioned OFL 
approach cannot distinguish between a horizontally rotating 3D sculpture face and natural 
rotations of a real face. 
Our approach lies within the category of motion, however, excluding the 
disadvantages. Firstly, since we require facial movements to be generated by either user 
cooperation or emotion stimulus4, lack of motion data is not an issue. Secondly, replicating 
facial movements on a 3D sculpture model is an impossible task.  It is worth noting that our 
strategy is similar to the use of encryption algorithm which makes passwords intrinsically 
harder to be cracked by imposters. Ultimately, since we are combining holistic facial 
movements in aid of face recognition, we eliminate the need to implement accessary face 
liveness detection unit.  
 
Dynamic Face Recognition 
Numerous researches have been conducted on dynamic face recognitions to exploit 
spatiotemporal facial movements. In the work of Tistarelli et al. physiological and behavioral 
cues for face recognition were derived from neural activation and infant behavioral studies 
[8]. Face recognition is being discussed from a human’s point of view - how does a human 
recognize a face in social situations. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
have revealed that visual tasks play a more influential role during face analysis and 
                                                 
4 Emotion stimulus will be explained in chapter 5. 
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recognition, where not only face-specific brain areas were involved, but a coherent neural 
activity was stored devoting to motion perception and gaze control [4]. This implies that in 
addition to static features related to shape and color, a “dynamic signature” can also be 
utilized to augment face recognition. For implementation, a dynamic face model consisted of 
multiple Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) is constructed to categorize facial expressions. 
Figure 5 illustrates the overall process of the authors’ approach. As a first step, video frames 
are clustered into 𝑥 number of spatial HMMs each of which represents a facial expression, 
where 𝑥 is determined by Bayesian Classifier. Next, emission probabilities of each cluster are 
trained using all the video sequences. Finally, the transition matrix and initial state 
probabilities are trained with respect to the temporal evolution to form a “Psuedo 
Hierarchical HMM (PH-HMM)”. Thus, the recognition process can be carried out by  
Figure 5. Multi-HMM approach for dynamic face recognition. 
(Courtesy of Tistarelli et al. [8]) 
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measuring similarity between two stochastic sequences. Similar face recognition techniques 
based on HMM have been studied in [29], [30], [31], and [32]. 
It is worth noting that during clustering (as in HMM-based approach) video frames 
are not in time sequence, meaning that the temporal information is being ignored where each 
video frame is labeled independently based on a discrete number of facial expressions. 
Conversely to their approach, we want to model motion behavior in a continuous manner 
such that the “true” facial moving pattern is revealed. By utilizing the Action Units defined 
by FACS which was developed by psychologist and physiologist, we can characterize facial 
movements into discrete continuous values or sequence rather than categories. 
The closest research to our approach in nature is the one conducted by Biuk and 
Loncaric where a pattern trajectory in the Eigen space (principle component analysis) was 
built from a sequence of face images rotating from -90° to +90° (Figure 6) [33]. The 
prototype trajectory was later compared against incoming samples using a distance 
measurement of two sequence. Nevertheless, trajectories were coordinated in the Eigen space 
which might not represent the actual facial movements. Additionally, distance measurement 
was accumulated in Euclidean, and thus would degrade rapidly with noise and sensitive to 
time variations [34]. Instead, our approach utilizes the Longest Common Subsequence 
(LCSS) method to accommodate inputs that are noisy and time-shifted. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Face images rotating from -90° to +90° used for Eigen space analysis. 
(Courtesy of Biuk and Loncaric [33]) 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Facial movement based authentication can be decomposed into two phases: 
enrollment and verification. During the enrollment phase, facial movements are being 
collected and characterized using the famous Facial Action Coding System (FACS). 3D 
dynamic face recognition is then carried out using the obtained facial action units to construct 
a representative model consisted of sequence and matching thresholds. In the verification 
stage, facial action units are again collected and compared with existing legitimate models to 
generate a similarity score. In the following sections, we detail the proposed methods for 
each step. 
 
Facial Movement Characterization 
In order to utilize facial movements for authentication, it is necessary to find a way to 
systematically categorize facial displacements with respect to their muscular formation. After 
reviewing a few existing encoding system, the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) was 
chosen as our characterization method because of its physiological and psychological 
foundation. In this section, we provide a brief overview of FACS and its implementation. 
 
Facial Action Coding System 
The Facial Action Coding System (FACS) provides a way to encode facial muscles 
from slight different instant changes in appearance [5]. The anatomical basis suggests that 
the nerves controlling the muscles are instinctively linked and related to each other whereas 
the psychologists state that natural facial expressions are constructed under emotional 
feelings [35]. With the research foundation from both physiologist and psychologists, FACS 
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has been established as a computed automated system to produce temporal profiles of each 
facial movement in videos. It has already been proven useful to psychologist for facial 
expression recognition analysis [3] [36] [37]. Since in our case we tend to focus on retrieving 
and matching individual action unit trajectories in sequence, FACS is converted to a 
verification tool rather than a recognition system.  
 
Action Units Implementation 
Action Units (AUs), as defined by FACS, are the fundamental actions of individual 
muscles or groups of muscles. FACS has defined 46 actions units in total, however, we have 
restricted our scope to six major AUs that are prominent in describing facial expressions [36] 
[37]. A complete list of the six AUs used in our experiment and their muscular basis can be 
found in Table 1 where individual muscle can be visualized5 in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Muscles of Human Face. 
(Courtesy of McGraw-Hill [35]) 
 
                                                 
5 Some of the muscles listed in Table 1. are not included in Figure 7. 
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Table 1. The six Action Units (AUs) used in our experiment and their muscular basis. 
AU Name and Number  
Number 
in 
FACS  
Muscular Basis 
Neutral Face 0 N/A 
Upper Lip Raiser - 0 10 levator labii superioris, caput infraorbitalis 
Jaw Lowerer - 1 26/27 
masseter; relaxed temporalis,  
internal pterygoid - 26 
pterygoids, digastric - 27 
Lip Stretcher - 2 20 risorius, platysma 
Brow Lowerer - 3 4 
depressor glabellae, depressor supercilii, 
corrugator supercilii 
Lip Corner Depressor - 4 13/15 
levator anguli oris - 13 
depressor anguli oris - 15 
Outer Brow Raiser - 5 2 frontalis 
 
We have employed the Face Tracking SDK6 from Microsoft for extracting the six 
AUs from Kinect for Windows. A similar approach to [38] has been taken to recognize the 
six action units. In total, 87 feature points are being tracked by the Active Appearance Model 
(AAM) [39] utilizing a 3D morphable model called Candide-3 to characterize shape and 
texture with shape units (SUs) [40]. As a result, each AU is discretized into values ranging 
from -1 to +1, representing the displacement from a neutral expression. For instance, for the 
lip stretcher, -1 is interpreted as fully rounded, 0 represents neutral, whereas +1 means fully 
stretched. Figure 8 illustrate the lip stretcher animated on the Candide-3 model. A complete  
list of SUs and AUs being used can be found at Appendix A. Therefore, for face recognition, 
                                                 
6 More details about the Face Tracking SDK can be found at 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/jj130970.aspx 
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Figure 8. The lip stretcher animated on the Candide-3 model. 
(Courtesy of Microsoft Face Tracking SDK) 
 
 
a template and a sample can be obtained by acquiring a sequence for each AU described 
above. In the next section, we focus on modeling such sequence and measuring the 
similarities between them to suit our need for authentication.  
 
3D Dynamic Face Recognition 
 By representing facial movements using six AUs defined by FACS, we can obtain six 
AU sequence to represent the identity model. The problem of face recognition is thus relaxed 
into a pattern recognition problem which usually involves matching two sequence [41].  In 
the following section, we briefly discuss the benefits and practical use of 3D, and then a 
detailed explanation of our methods will be followed. 
 
3D 
Intuitively, depth information adds robustness to face recognition by representing the 
real facial appearance. Since head-orientation may occur, the third dimension helps 
approximate frontal view of the face to compensate 2D-specific problems such as pose and 
illumination. Before the emergence of affordable and accurate 3D scanners, numerous efforts 
have been made to recover the depth by either triangulation [42] or perception [43] [44]. 
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However, it is clear that neither of these methods can be compared to a 3D camera which is 
capable of obtaining depth and color streams at the same time.  
In our experiment, the Kinect camera obtains the depth data by performing the 
following steps: 1) an IR emitter projects a random speckle pattern to be perceived by the IR 
receiver; 2) a reference plane reflecting the true distance to the camera plane is generated in 
the center surrounded by object planes; 3) a triangulation between the reference and the 
object plane is carried out to calculate the distance from point to point [45]. Figure 9 
illustrate Kinect’s depth sensing capability. It is worth to mention that several environmental 
factors have to be considered when using depth data obtained in this way. Firstly, depth 
accuracy will degrade with distance, thus a working depth range should be controlled 
between 1m to 1.5m to allow effective recognition. Secondly, since depth measurements are 
most accurate on the reference plane, user’s face should be guided to fit entirely inside a 
centering window. Thirdly, due to the reflective nature of IR, objects absorbing IR lights 
should be removed on user’s face to ensure an accurate reading and also eliminate 
occlusions.  
Figure 9. Kinect depth sensing.  
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Similarity Measurement 
 Similarity measurement is the heart of many sequence data mining applications and it 
is also applied in gait recognition techniques – another biometric authentication method 
based on behavioral traits – where the 3-axis acceleration sequence are matched [46]. As we 
have seen in Chapter 3, distance of two still face images can be estimated by performing 
Principle Component Analysis (PCA), however, measuring the distance between two 
trajectories is a different problem. In general, there are three most commonly used methods 
for matching two sequence [47]: 
1. Euclidean Distance (ED) 
ED is a popular approach for defining similarity of sequence mainly because of its 
simplicity – it directly calculates the point to point distance. However, ED is prone to 
noise and does not accommodate variations in time phase, thus is rarely used in 
practical applications. 
2. Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) 
DTW is a method that allows an elastic shifting of the time axis to accommodate 
sequences which are similar, but out of time phase. It is based on dynamic 
programming which was proved to be a very reliable method. However, it does not 
obey the triangular inequality, and again prone to noise. 
3. Longest common Subsequence (LCSS) 
LCSS is more robust than DTW under noisy conditions. It focuses on the most 
common part of two sequences eliminating impacts of noises and outliers (outlier 
means data at the beginning and ending). It allows sequences to be stretched by  
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setting the time and space thresholds without rearranging the order but allowing some 
features to be unmatched. 
To conclude, it has been proven that LCSS is more reliable than ED and DTW when 
it comes to measuring similarity between two trajectories [34] [47] [48]. Figure 10 illustrates 
the quality matching of LCSS compared to other methods in the presence of noise. We can 
Figure 10. LCSS pattern matching compared to ED and DTW. 
(Courtesy of Vlachos et al. [34]) 
 
 
observe that, ED is extremely inflexible in matching and DTW performs excessive and 
spurious matching. Suiting our need for face authentication, LCSS has been formulated as 
follows: 
Given an integer 𝛿 controlling flexibility in time and a real number 𝜀 ∈ [0,1] 
constraining matching in space, two sequence 𝐴 = ((𝑎𝑥,1),… , (𝑎𝑥,𝑚)) and 𝐵 =
((𝑏𝑥,1), … , (𝑏𝑥,𝑛)) with size 𝑚 and 𝑛, respectively, let 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝐴) = (𝑎𝑥,1),… , (𝑎𝑥,𝑚−1) be the 
function to eliminate the last element from sequence 𝐴, then 𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝐴, 𝐵) can be defined as: 
𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝐴, 𝐵)
{
  
 
  
 
0             𝑖𝑓 𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐵 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦                          
1 + 𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝐴), 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝐵))                 
      𝑖𝑓   |𝑎𝑥,𝑚 − 𝑏𝑥,𝑛| < 𝜀              
        𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑚 − 𝑛| ≤ 𝛿                       
max (𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝐴), 𝐵),                            
           𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝐴, 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝐵))       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 (1) 
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Additionally, by employing the concept of dynamic programming, a hash table 𝐻(𝑖, 𝑗) where 
𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑚], 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑛]  can be used for storing previous LCSS results such that: 
𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝐴, 𝐵) {
𝐻(𝑖, 𝑗)     𝑖𝑓 𝐻(𝑖, 𝑗) ≠ −1
𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝐴, 𝐵)  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
Assuming that values being stored in 𝐻(𝑖, 𝑗) are all initialized to −1, therefore, whenever 
𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛿,𝜀(𝐴, 𝐵) is evaluated in equation (1) previously hashed result is always checked first. 
Thus, the computation time of LCSS 𝑂(𝛿(𝑚 + 𝑛)) can be greatly reduced by trading off a 
space complexity of 𝑂(𝑚 ∗ 𝑛). Finally, the similarity S𝐴,𝐵 between the two sequence A and 
B can be defined as follows: 
                       S𝐴,𝐵 =
LCSS𝛿,𝜀(A, B)
min(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝐴), 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝐵))
                        (𝟐) 
Thus the similarity score is generated by normalizing LCSS result with respect to the smaller 
size of two sequence. 
 
Modeling 
After the enrollment samples become available, an identity model has to be 
constructed to create a user profile. There are numerous ways to build the model from simply 
picking the first sample to averaging over the entire set, it is clear that a more robust 
approach has to be taken to accommodate erroneous samples. Acknowledging the fact that 
the identity model will be later compared with probe samples using LCSS, we have proposed 
a voting mechanism based on the similarity results generated by LCSS. Specifically, LCSS is 
performed on each sample against every other sample, the one with the highest average 
similarity get picked. Thus, each AU is modeled by its most representative sequence based 
on LCSS results.  
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Adaptive Time and Space Controls 
In addition to storing the most representative sequence, our model also includes two 
LCSS control parameters: time and space, which controls the flexibility in matching two 
sequence. These two parameters are adaptively computed from each enrollment sample by 
the following two steps:  
1. From each enrollment sample, find the maximum value and its time index. 
2. The space control parameter 𝜀 and time control parameter 𝛿 are approximated by: 
𝜀 = (∑max(𝑀1…𝑁)
𝑁
1
−𝑀𝑖)
1
𝑁
 
𝛿 = (∑max(𝑇1…𝑁)
𝑁
1
− 𝑇𝑖)
1
𝑁
 
where 𝑀𝑖 the maximum AU value of sample 𝑖, 𝑇𝑖 the time index of 𝑀𝑖 within sample 𝑖, 𝑁 is 
the number of samples used for building the model, max is a function selecting the maximum 
value from an array of AU values.  
In other words, control thresholds are obtained by averaging time and space distances 
to the absolute upper bound values, and they are indeed an approximation of the real position 
where the most representative sample will lie on. Therefore, we can guarantee that the model 
is the nearest neighbor to all given samples. Figure 11 illustrates the estimated position of the 
chosen sequence 𝑄 bounded by time and space thresholds 𝜀 and 𝛿 where A represents an 
unmatched probe. 
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Figure 11. Estimated gallery 𝑸 lies in the center of an envelope bounded by matching            
thresholds  𝜺 and 𝜹, where 𝑨 is an unmatched probe. 
(Courtesy of Vlachos et al. [34]) 
 
 
Combined AU Model and Result 
One representative sequence is selected from each sample based on the LCSS 
characteristics. In total six sequence along with their own time and space thresholds are 
combined together to form the final model. In such a way, each AU is validated based its 
own model, which result in a much accurate similarity measurement. During the 
authentication phase, each AU model is generating a similarity for the incoming sample. It is 
worth noting that it is nearly impossible to distinguish the model from illegitimate samples 
by focusing on only one similarity. The reason is that the subjects are all performing similar 
tasks, thus sharing certain degree of similarity in term of behavior. In order to reveal the 
distinction, we have decided to fuse the similarities resulted from each AU model 
comparison all together to intensify dissimilarity which in turn improve false positive rate. 
The fused similarity is used for making the decision. The similarities are being fused 
using the weighted sum model to exploit priori knowledge such as which facial expression 
was performed to generate the AUs. Since different AUs may respond differently to various 
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expressions, a greater weight can be assigned to certain AUs. For instance, if the AUs were 
acquired by smiling, then the lip stretcher and eyebrow raiser are given more weights since 
their values change significantly during smiling. Therefore, the authentication decision model 
can be seen in the following equation:  
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =∑𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑖
6
𝑖=1
  
where 𝑤𝑖 denotes the relative importance weight of each AU and 𝑎𝑖 indicates the similarity 
result obtained by matching each pair of AU probe and gallery. 
This approach is analogous to multimodal biometric authentication where a 
combination of biometrics is used to for authentication and can usually lead to an improved 
recognition rate [21]. Ultimately, all samples used for enrollment are evaluated using the 
above decision model and the lowest score obtained is added to the model as the decision 
threshold Θ such that:  
𝑖𝑓      𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑒) ≥ 𝜃     
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛       𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑒 ≅ 𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑦              
That is, if an incoming probe sample’s similarity score is greater than or equal to 
gallery’s decision threshold Θ then they are considered similar, thus authorizing the user for 
security access. 
To summarize, after modeling user profile will contain: 
1. Six most representative sequences for each AU 
2. Time and space threshold  
3. Similarity decision threshold 
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CHAPTER 5. USE SCENARIOS 
 
 In this chapter, data acquisition methods and an authentication scheme are proposed 
to apply dynamic face recognition for authentication purpose. At the end, we provide a 
theoretical evaluation against potential adversaries to offer some insight on the security of 
our approach. 
 
Data Acquisition Method 
Since the performance of our authentication system relies heavily on the quality of 
facial movement inputs, effective data collection methods have to be considered. In the 
following section, we have proposed three methods to generate the desired data. During the 
enrollment phase, the user will be instructed to perform one of the following tasks: 1) 
imitating exemplar photos; 2) watching hilarious videos; 3) pronouncing words, all of which 
are meant to reveal facial movements either artificially (1 and 3) or naturally (3). A brief 
discussion on the benefits and drawbacks of each task will be provided following method 
description. 
 
Imitation-based Design 
Imitation-based method was employed used by Shichuan at el. in their research of 
compound facial expressions [3]. Figure 12 shows one of the compound facial expressions – 
happily disgusted which is a result of two emotion stimulus: happy and disgust. Exemplars 
were provided to help the participant produce a facial expression. The author did emphasize 
that the participant was not instructed to look exactly the same as exemplar photos, but rather 
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encouraged to express each emotion as clear as possible. In this case, basic emotions 
(expressions) are chosen to simplify the imitations. 
 
Figure 12. An example of compound facial expression – happily disgusted. 
(Courtesy of Shichuan at el. [3]) 
 
However, each facial expression that had been derived from the participants was 
solely relying on their ability to perform. An imaginary situation was suggested and a sample 
picture was given for each expression but, predictably, many participants in this experiment 
failed to clearly express the emotion as the muscle changes were not a result of instinctive 
reaction but rather forcefully conveyed. Acknowledging the fact that most of us cannot make 
a particular facial expression without emotional stimulus, except for actors, this method is 
retained from practical use of authentication system. 
 
Video-based Design   
In order to capture facial expressions, a corresponding stimulus has to present. For 
instance, in order for an identity to feel happily disgusted, probably the identity needs to 
watch a comedy that is disgusting to some extent. Thus, in this design we propose to play 
videos from different emotional category for generating corresponding facial expressions 
used for authentication. A typical authentication scenario would be: whenever an identity is 
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claimed, a series of hilarious videos are played to stimulate a nature facial reaction on the 
identity’s face. Only in this way can we guarantee that the true facial behavior is being 
captured by the camera.  
Nonetheless, it may be viable if the expression has only to be obtained once, 
however, this method may not be applicable to an authentication system - where the same 
expressions have to be repeated whenever the identity is claimed. Since the identity will 
eventually become accustomed to certain stimulus, it would be unrealistic to explore new 
ones to arouse the same emotion again. Not to mention that, finding a stimulus for someone 
to show a specific facial expression itself is a challenging task since every person may react 
differently to each stimulus. 
 
Pronunciation-based Design 
As an alternative to the previous two methods, we have proposed a method based on 
pronunciation which similar to the data collection mechanism in voice authentication 
techniques [49]. We have examined each of the 26 English letters to see which ones will 
result in most significant chances in facial muscles. Each letter is being pronounced 
repeatedly, and is compared against each other. As expected, vowel sounds are the most 
significant contributor to muscle changes during pronunciations whereas consonants have 
little impact on facial displacement. The 26 letters can therefore be classified into groups 
with respect to their vowel sounds. For instance, the letters “A”, “H”, “J”, “K” can be 
grouped together since their pronunciation involve the vowel sound /ei/. The complete 
groups for seven vowels can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Grouping 26 English letters by their vowel sounds. 
Vowel  Letters having the same vowel  
/ei/ A, H, J, K 
/i:/ B, C, D, E, G, P, T, V, Z 
/e/ F, L, M, N, S, X, Z 
/ai/ I, Y 
/əƱ/ O 
/u:/ Q, U, W 
/a:/ R 
 
Ideally, facial muscle movements can be revealed by letting the user pronounce a 
letter from the 7 vowel categories; however, several drawbacks can be easily observed when 
it comes to practical data collection. Firstly, single vowel sound will only generate facial 
displacement momentarily making it hard to be captured in real-time. Secondly, it is difficult 
to go back to neutral state while repeating a single vowel sound, thus it may result in 
residuals in the “move back” stage pushing the next pronunciation to an undefined initial 
state. Therefore, a combination of consonant and vowel sound is proposed to relax this 
problem. We have decided to use “WE” in our experiment since the sound of /w/ will likely 
reset the face to a known state before each pronunciation whereas “E” being the major 
contributor to muscle changes. Our experiment result, which will be shown in Chapter 6, 
supports our statement made above. 
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Authentication Scheme 
 A typical authentication scheme is composed of two phases: enrollment and 
verification. In the following sections, we uncover the methods we have proposed for each 
phase followed by a discussion on the potential attacks against our design. 
 
Enrollment 
During the enrollment phase, the user is asked to follow instructions in a restrictive 
manner. Acknowledging the environmental factors we had mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
registration process is carried out in a relatively dark environment to ensure that the intensity 
of depth sensor is not being affected. The user needs to remove any objects on their face, 
such as glasses and hats, to eliminate occlusions and reflection. The user is guided to move 
accordingly to fit the entire face in a rectangle, which is chosen to guarantee an optimal 
accuracy for the depth measurement. Finally, the user is instructed to perform one of the 
tasks as described in the data collection section. In the subsequent steps, facial action units 
are computed from each video frame resulting in a number of temporal trajectories. Based on 
best average similarities against the other trajectories, one of these trajectories is determined 
to represent the identity model to guarantee that it is the nearest neighbor to all given 
trajectories. Additionally, the time and space matching thresholds used for LCSS similarity 
measurement are adaptively computed from enrollment trajectories and are stored along with 
the model. The decision threshold is determined from the lowest similarity score. 
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Verification 
When it comes to making an authentication decision, the user is again asked to 
perform one of the data gathering tasks as described in the previous section. A number of AU 
sequence are extracted and compared with existing legitimate models using LCSS with the 
time and space threshold stored in the models. Similarity results are generated and a 
combined matching score is calculated and compared with the decision threshold to 
determine the final decision. 
 
Adversary Model 
Regardless of the performance, authentication systems are of no practical use if they 
are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. In order to make it more reliable and secure, the 
circumvention factor has to be evaluated. In this section, we attempt to evaluate our proposed 
methods against possible attacks, potential hazards are provided at the end.  
 Potential attacks against face authentication system can be broadly divided into two 
types: indirect attack and direct attack. Indirect attack or software attack requires priori 
knowledge of the system component but can be powerful if deliberately implemented. 
Efficient software attack has been proposed by Javier et al. to evaluate the vulnerability of 
face authentication systems [50]. Input facial images were synthesized statistically and the 
hill-climbing algorithm was adopted to mathematically calculate a converging similarity 
score. However, the authors assumed to have the access to the evaluation score of the 
matching function, which is normally not exposed while system is running. Thus, we focus 
on discussing another type of attack – direct attack.  
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Direct attack or spoofing attack is the most commonly used method, which aims at 
fooling the camera with a face replica of the legitimate user. We have already seen in 
Chapter 3 that previous liveness detection approaches against spoofing attacks may fail under 
certain conditions. However, our method is invulnerable to spoofing attack because of the 
following two reasons: 
1. Facial movements are exploited for authentication, thus preventing photo playbacks. 
2. Depth data are utilized during recognition, therefore forbidding video playbacks. 
Traditional playback attacks can be efficiently prevented by employing dynamic features but 
facial movements still can be played back to the camera if a video is recorded. That is one of 
the reasons why the third dimension is added since it is nearly impossible to replay 3D facial 
movements. It is worth noting that if we have only utilized 3D static features, the adversary 
could still possibly produce a 3D facial mask to spoof our system [1]. By combining 3D and 
face dynamics together, the secureness of our face authenticator can be greatly increased. 
 Theoretically, our authenticator can be bypassed using both a replica of facial 
movements and a replica of depth. One way is to animate facial expression on a face 
sculpture made with artificial muscle tissues such that an actual duplicate of facial 
appearance is created. In this case, emotion stimulus (video-based design) can be employed 
to countermeasure such attack acknowledging the fact that facial expressions stimulated by 
emotion are intrinsically linked with underlying neural, which cannot be easily replicated. 
However, the video-based design is left as a future work given the difficulty to stimulate 
emotions repeatedly. Another potential attack should aim at fooling the depth sensor such 
that a video-based attack can be carried out with depth replica. Consider, for example, the 
most commonly used infrared (IR) sensor which measures depth either by a process of 
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triangulation or observing structured lights. In either way, it is possible to deflect or even 
absorb the infrared lights and replay the depth data by projecting artificial lights from the 
same direction of the camera. We believe that this type of attack can be potentially prevented 
if the verification environment is strictly controlled.  
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CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION AND RESULT 
  
 Experiments had been conducted to evaluate our methods. The experiments were 
carried out with the Kinect camera and the Face Tracking SDK. To begin with, we 
investigated the action units generated by making a facial expression. Next, ten participants 
were invited to undergo the proposed authentication scheme. Similarities between the 
sequences obtained from the same subject were measured and examined using LCSS. 
Finally, similarity scores were generated with one gallery subject and nine probe subjects. 
Result are summarized following each section. 
 
Action Unit Analysis 
Six action units (AUs) were considered in our experiment with each AU expressed as 
a numeric value varying between -1 and +1. These coefficients represent deformations of the 
3D mask caused by the moving parts of the face (mouth, eyebrows, and so on). Experiments 
were first conducted to evaluate action units’ responses to a facial expression. Using the 
pronunciation-based design we have proposed for data collection, two types of samples were 
generated by making the sound “E” and “WE”. Each pronunciation process was carried out 
from the neutral state to fully stretched state (Figure 13). Figure 14 presents the sample data 
collected by pronouncing each word twice with a one second delay in between. 
Figure 13. Pronunciation of “E” with superimposed feature points. On the left is the                                 
neutral face whereas on the right is the fully stretched face. 
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Figure 14. Plots of six AU numeric weights with respect to the time frame in response to 
the pronunciation of (a) “WE” and (b) “E”. Note the difference between two lip 
stretchers, which is the major contributor to facial muscle changes. 
 
 
By observation, we can see that for both of the pronunciation the lip stretcher served 
as the major contributor to facial muscle displacements whereas the rest of the AUs resulted 
in a less significant response. Thus the obtained result corresponds to our initial statement 
made in Chapter 4 where a greater weight could be assigned to certain AUs based on the 
prior knowledge of the performed facial expressions.  
 
(a) 
(b) 
(b) 
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Furthermore, it is clear that the sound “WE” generated much cleaner and useable AUs 
as opposed to “E” where a residual was remained prior to neutral state. Thus, the experiment 
result complies with our assumption made earlier in Chapter 5 where a combination of 
consonant and vowel sound delivers a more quality result compared to pronouncing the 
vowel sound itself.  
Finally, we observe that there exist some noises in the plots:  
1. We have outliers which are either smaller or large than the average values.  
2. Time index varies from one sample to another. 
These types of noises were either introduced by face tracking or AU extraction or simply due 
to the fact that most of the subjects could not perform the same facial expression consistently. 
However, we do observe that a certain pattern can be pulled out from these samples to 
represent an identity as long as the method we use for measuring similarity – LCSS – is 
capable of accommodating the two forms of noises mentioned above. 
 
Authentication 
Ten subjects were invited to participate in our experiment. Each subject was asked to 
pronounce the word “WE” 30 times where each pronunciation was carried out within 4 
seconds. Including the time spent on computations, 26 frames per second was achieved. 
Figure 15 provides an overview of the program flow we had proposed for authentication 
experiments. During the enrollment phase, the Kinect camera was first initialized for color 
and depth stream acquisition. Next, the Face Tracking thread was initiated to actively learn 
the shape units (SUs) from a user’s face. Once the SUs had converged, which might take up 
to two minutes, the enrollment process was started to repeatedly collect AU sequence with a  
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Figure 15. Authentication experiment program flow. 
 
 
4 seconds interval. After retrieving enough number of sequence samples, a subset of the 
samples was used for building the model whereas the remaining ones were retained for 
validation. For model construction, the LCSS time and space thresholds were first calculated 
based on average distance to the maximum values, then for each candidate sample, LCSS 
was computed against every other candidate to generate a similarity matrix. Finally, 
considering the best average similarity, one most representative sequence was stored with 
time and space thresholds to characterize the identity model. Figure 16 shows the selected 
gallery sequence for the Lip Stretcher along with other candidate sequences. 
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Figure 16. The selected gallery sequence for the Lip Stretcher. 
 
 
Similar to the enrollment phase, the verification phase was proposed for collecting 
probe samples. However, since we had decided to perform cross validation, probe samples 
were already obtained during the enrollment phase. Therefore, the verification stage was 
carried out completely offline to effectively evaluate our algorithm. For each probe sample, 
six different AU sequence were extracted and compared against existing gallery models to 
generate six similarity results. The similarity results were being fused using the weighted 
summation model to exploit priori knowledge of performed facial expression. In this case, 
since the AUs were acquired by pronouncing the word “WE” (similar to smiling), lip 
stretcher was assigned more weight.  
Figure 17 displays the final result of our experiment. In this experiment, subject 1 was 
chosen to be the gallery which was also compared against itself with its own 10 validation 
samples. We can observe that similarities above 0.85 were achieved for subject 1 whereas 
most of the other subjects exhibited similarities below 0.85 (except for sample 3 of subject 6  
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Figure 17. Similarity result for ten subjects. Subject 1 was chosen as the gallery. 
 
 
which was a false positive). Since decision threshold was set by the model, which was 0.85, 
thus we could authenticate subject 1 and reject the others effectively.  
Cross validations were performed on all the samples with each subject selected to be 
the gallery model respectively. The evaluation result has been presented in Table 3. Overall, 
a 95% recognition rate was achieved with a 7% false positive rate. 
 
Table 3. Experiment evaluation result. 
Authentication 
Decision 
Test Condition 
NO YES 
Test 
Outcome 
YES 7% (False positive) 95% 
NO 93% 5% (False negative) 
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Discussion 
Down Slope Sampling 
Since the subjects could intentionally control their facial muscle during up slope 
process, we believe that up slope (neutral to maximal) facial movements might be similar for 
all subjects whereas down slope (maximal to neutral) ought to be distinctive. Experiment had 
been conducted using only the down slopes for sampling and modeling. However, no better 
result than using the entire sequence as a whole was observed. It was mainly because the 
down slope happened too fast that the camera was not able to catch the full details. In our 
experiment, the down slope lasted for only 5 to 6 frames for most of the samples collected 
which is approximately 0.2 second (since the program could achieve up to 26 frames per 
second). 
 
Real-time Authentication 
We had proposed a real-time verification scheme but it was not implemented. We 
believe that once our approach become more robust and mature after offline validations, a 
fully automatic authentication scheme can be easily developed later on. 
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Summary 
Considering emerging security concerns of currently existing facial recognition 
techniques and also inspired by the work of physiologists and psychologists on the use of 
facial movement for face perception, we had proposed an authentication method based on 
spatiotemporal facial patterns. We have demonstrated that our method is able to satisfy the 
five requirements (2.1 – 2.5) as mentioned in Chapter 2.  
In chapter 3, we included a literature review for existing researches. An overview of 
authentication had been given at the beginning to compare and evaluate different methods. 
Subsequently, we had shown that existing liveness detection techniques might fail to counter 
measure spoofing attacks under various conditions. Finally, we indicated that previous 
dynamic approaches only aimed at improving recognition rate which might not respect the 
true facial behavior. 
In chapter 4, we detailed the proposed methods for our approach. Facial movements 
were encoded by the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) where each action unit (AU) 
characterized a set of anatomically related facial muscles. We briefly covered the benefits 
and practical use of the third dimension. For authentication, an identity model is constructed 
by extracting multiply AU sequence from enrollment samples, and one most representative 
sequence was selected for each AU based on best average LCSS similarity results. Along 
with the chosen sequence, time and space thresholds for LCSS matching were also adaptively 
computed and stored in the model. Similarity between the gallery and probe was computed  
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by LCSS, and the final decision is determined by fusing similarities results produced by all 
AUs.  
In chapter 5, we delivered the use scenario for authentication. Three data acquisition 
methods had been proposed and an authentication scheme was given. We had explained how 
to prevent impersonation attacks by employing 3D dynamic features. An evaluation on 
potential hazards were also given to provide some insight on the security of our approach. 
In chapter 6, we explained the experiments that had been conducted. The proposed 
pronunciation-based design was implemented as the data acquisition method to evaluate the 
AU data collected. Sequence similarities were then measured on the same subject to evaluate 
LCSS results. Finally, ten subjects were invited to participate in our experiment, and the 
results had shown that our method was able to differentiate user identities based on facial 
behavior. 
 
Future Work 
For experimental purpose, only six action units were considered in this thesis. A more 
robust approach can be taken by utilizing all 46 action units as described in the FACS. The 
combinational model formed by all the action units can then represent the universal facial 
behavior for each individual, thus leading to a more secure and non-replicable identification.  
We have demonstrated data acquisition using the pronunciation-based design, 
however we believe that video-based design is more desirable given the fact that facial 
expressions stimulated by emotion stimulus represent the true facial behaviors. Further 
investigation has to be made considering the complexity to discover differing emotion 
stimulus for repetitive authentication. 
44 
One pitfall can be foreseen in long run is that user may not be able to gain access to 
the system due to changes in facial appearance, i.e. aging. This problem can be potentially 
prevented by performing a periodic profile refreshment every time the user is authenticated, 
thus adapting the identity model gradually. 
Voice recognition provides an alternative to face recognition. Since we have 
employed an authentication scheme which involves pronunciations, voice recognition can be 
easily adopted to our system to serve as an alternative - in case the face recognition does not 
perform well under certain circumstances - or even combined with facial features to compose 
a multi-modal biometric authentication system. Although it does make implementation of the 
system more complicated, it is believed that accuracy and false positive rate can be 
effectively improved since the errors will be uniformly distributed among each feature 
metrics and thus resulting in a smaller error rate after a weighted summation. It is worth to 
mention that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is working towards the Next 
Generation Identification System7 (NGI) which combines multiple biometric features 
together for criminal identification. 
                                                 
7 More details about the Next Generation Identification System (NGI) can be found at 
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi 
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APPENDIX A. SHAPE UNITS AND ACTION UNITS 
 
Shape units (SUs) define shape parameters of a neutral face - eyes, mouth, nose, thus 
remain unchanged over time. The Face Tracking SDK tracks the following 11 SUs (Table 4.). 
Each SU specifies the vertices it affects and the displacement (x,y,z) per affected vertex. In order 
to guarantee an accurate measurement of the SUs, the Face Tracking SDK needs to learn the SUs 
in real-time which takes approximately 2 minutes.  
 
Table 4. The complete list of SUs. 
SU Name SU number in Candide-3 
Head height 0 
Eyebrows vertical position 1 
Eyes vertical position 2 
Eyes, width 3 
Eyes, height 4 
Eye separation distance 5 
Nose vertical position 8 
Mouth vertical position 10 
Mouth width 11 
Eyes vertical difference n/a 
Chin width n/a 
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Action units (AUs) are defined by the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), each of 
which is anatomically related to the contraction of a specific set of facial muscles movement. 
Figure 18 contains a complete list of the six AUs being tracked by the Face Tracking SDK 
animated on the Candide-3 model and their corresponding range of values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. The complete list of AUs. 
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APPENDIX B. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
